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INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION IN TIMES OF CRISIS
PROFESSOR DOUG JONES*

The preservationand protectionofcitizens' welfare and the State's economic
and political interests in encouragingforeign investment form 2 sides of
the same coin. The emergence of an extensive global network of Bilateral
Investment Treaties therefore, can be attributed primarily to the desire of
States to safeguard their foreign investments. Traditionallyperceived as
being harmless accords, Bilateral Investment Treaties have increasingly
occupied global centre stagefor their ability to impact States in multiple ways,
especially during times of crisis. And in light of this amplified significance,
the growth and evolution of the international investment treaty regime
has become extremely necessary. This article delineates the essential legal
elements of BilateralInvestment Treaties and examines theirusage in light of
landmarkinvestment aoards.It also discusses measures that States can adopt
in order to achieve the investor-citizen balance in times of crisis. Finally,
the author proposes reforms that could be implemented in general and at
the InternationalCentrefor Settlement of Investment Disputes, in order to
address currentissues with the process of Investment Treaty Arbitration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of Bilateral Investment Treaties [Hereinafter, "BITs"],
Multilateral Investment Treaties [Hereinafter,"MITs"], and Free Trade Agreements
[Hereinafter,"FTAs"], worldwide has been largely motivated by a desire to protect
and promote foreign investment. International Investment Agreements [Hereinafter,
"IlAs"], have now become the most widely used mechanism for the promotion
and reciprocal protection of investments. Host States that sign IIAs offer protection
to investors in their State. Such protections include compensation that may be
awarded for losses resulting from expropriation, armed conflict, revolution,
discriminatory treatment of foreign investors and requisitioning or destruction of
the property by a State's forces or authorities amongst other political, economic and
environmental disturbances. In the case of disputes, most IAs provide that any
dispute arising between the State and the investor concerning the interpretation or
application of the treaty that is not resolved through negotiations may be directly
submitted to arbitration.
In the past, BITs were regarded as reasonably straight-forward and innocuous
instruments and in the early days, negotiating BITs was not a long or protracted
affair. Developing countries involved would generally be quite anxious to secure
BITs with major capital exporting States and were willing to give very favourable
treaty terms to more powerful nations in a bid to secure foreign investment at all
costs.IHowever, the jurisprudence of investor-State arbitration over the last decade
has indicated that BITs are not at all innocuous and both States and investors should
exercise great care and caution when entering them. This becomes most apparent
in times of crisis where States can find themselves trapped in positions where they
are presented with the competing interests of their citizens and investors. Likewise,
investors can be exposed to adverse risks to which arbitration is sometimes the
only recourse. The measures and responses that States choose to implement in
times of crisis are critical as they can give investors grounds under which to bring
a claim in arbitration against the host State.
This article will outline the relevant legal provisions in situations of crisis
such as economic, military and environmental disasters through the examining of
different sources of law, in particular, international customary law, treaty based
provisions as well as some landmark awards. The article will also discuss what
parties to a BIT can do to mitigate risk in situations of crisis both before they happen,
1

Chester Brown, lnvestor-StateArbitration as the "New Frontier" 28 TIflE ARI3ITRAioR AND
M i:\kOR 59, 60-61 (2009).
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at the drafting stage of the BIT and some expedient measures to be taken post factum
by way of damage control when a crisis has broken out. Finally the article will
outline some suggested areas for reform, both generally and at the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes [Hereinafter,"ICSID"], that need
to take place in order to more effectively respond to the needs of the parties to
arbitrations that have come about as a result of a crisis.

II.

CONTEXTUALISING INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION IN

TIMES OF CRISIS
Investor-State arbitration is a dispute resolution process for individual and
private investors who seek a neutral forum for a claim against a State in which they
have made an investment? Today investor-State arbitration operates within the
framework of the ICSID, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law [Hereinafter, "UNCITRAL"], and other arbitration rules, which are referred
to in more than 3000 BITs.
The history of investor-State disputes starts in 1930 with the famous Lena
Goldfields v. USSR ad hoc case. Both parties had signed a concession contract
including an arbitration clause referring to a three-member arbitral tribunal in
London, where one arbitrator was to be appointed by each of the parties and one
arbitrator by the Freiberg Mining Academyi After the withdrawal of the Soviet
appointed arbitrator the two member tribunal awarded almost thirteen million
pounds to Lena Goldfields.4 Between the 1950s and 1970s more cases on concession
arbitration between companies and the Gulf States appeared. The most remarkable
decision of this period is the ARAMACO Case' over the infringement of concession
rights by Saudi Arabia and the Libyan Nationalisationcases in the 1970s.1 In tandem
with these cases, the finalising of the ICSID Convention in 1965, and the adoption of
UNCrIRAL Arbitration Rules in 1976 began a new era for investor-State arbitration.

2
3

Timothy G. Nelson, "HistoryAin't Changed": Why Investor StateArbitration Will Survive
the 'New Revolution' in Michael Waibel et al (es.), THE BACKLASH AGAINSIr INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REAitY, 55 (2010).
V. V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas 47
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARI ERL:Y 747, 790 (1998).
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Arthur Nussbaum, Arbitrationbetween the Lena Goldfields Ltd. and the Soviet Government
36 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 48, 51 (1950).
Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 ILR 117.
Texas Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17
ILM 3.
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Over 30 years later, investor-State arbitration has developed considerably. As
of 30 June 2012, the ICSID, which is an autonomous institution under the auspices
of the World Bank and established by a convention to which there are over 147
members States, has registered 390 cases. In 63% of cases, the ICSID's jurisdiction
to hear the cases arose from BITs. In 48% of disputes decided by arbitral tribunals
under the ICSID Convention, the outcome favoured the investor as the award
upheld their claims in part or in full. Out of 36 annulment proceedings under the
ICSID Convention, only 8 were successfu l between 2001 and 20117 In regards to
the geographic distribution of ICSID cases, South America alone accounted for
29% of the State parties involved in ISID proceedings. Among South American
States, Argentina still accounts for a disproportionate number of outstanding
claims, representing nearly one sixth of the ICSID's pending case-load.8 The vast
majority of these claims against Argentina can be attributed to the effects of the
'emergency measures' Argentina implemented in response to its 2001-02 economic
crisis and brought by U.S. investors under the 1991 U.S.-Argentina BIT. The most
notable of these claims, which have been exhaustively analysed by academics and
practitioners alike, include CMS v. Argentina,9 LG&E v. Argentina,0 Sempra Energy
International v. Argentine Republic," Enron Corporationand PonderosaAssets, LP
(U.S.) v. Argentine Republic12 and Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine
Republic.,3 In contrast, however, Asian States appear to be quite under-represented
in the ICSID statistics, with several countries, including India, not being listed as
having any claims pending against them or any which have been concluded. 4 The
Investment TreatyArbitration [Hereinafter,"ITA'] statistics provide similar results.)5
7
8
9
10
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14
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ICSID, Pending Cases, availableat https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?req
uestType--GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (Last visited on 30 July 2013).
Id.
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, (CMS v. Argentine
Republic) (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of 12 May 2005).
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International Inc. v. The Argentine
Republic, (LG&E v. Argentine Republic) (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award of 25 July
2007).
Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award of 28 September 2007).
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets v, Argentina, (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award of 22 May 2007).
Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award of 5 September 2008).
Supra note 7; ICSID, Concluded Cases, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Fr
ontServlet?requestType-=GenCaseDtIsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded (Last visited on
30 July 2013).
Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA), available at http://www.italaw.com/cases-byrespondent?field case-respondent tid"All&-Apply (Last visited on 30 July 2013).
30
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In the major investor-State disputes in times of crisis that have taken place
over the last decade, the causes of disagreement between investors and States have
contained some recurrent themes. These include: disagreements over character, that
is, whether a provision is self-judging or not; disagreements over the application
and scope of the defence of necessity; the existence of alternative measures and
the State's contribution to a crisis.
III. SOURCES OF LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS
The law in the context of investor-State arbitration derives from two sources:
customary international law and treaty based law. States have increasingly relied
on customary international law defences to excuse investment treaty breaches.
Such defences excuse a State's unlawful actions if specific preconditions are met
but they are subject to strict limitations.
Concurrently, there are certain standards of protection found within treaties
that afford investors protection. Although BITs are not identical, they tend to
cover the same issues and contain similarly worded standard clauses (National
Models BITs). These standard clauses are intended to remedy the uncertainty of
customary law doctrines.
A line of ICSID awards rendered over the last decade illustrates the application
of both customary defences and treaty based protections. The following section
of this paper will outline the most commonly invoked defences and protections,
explain their mechanics and examine their effectiveness.
A. International Customary Law and State Defences
First and foremost, under international customary law all States have an
obligation to ensure that aliens are treated in accordance with what is known as
the 'minimum standard of treatment' and any treatment that falls short of this
level gives rise to liability on the part of the State. Case law points to a number of
areas to which the notion of an international minimum standard applies. These
include the administration of justice in cases involving foreign nationals (usually
linked to the notion of denial of justice), the treatment of aliens under detention and
the full protection and security of aliens. 6 The latter is usually understood as the
16

US and Mexico General Claims Commission, Janes Claim, United Nations, Reports of
InternationalArbitralAwards, 1926, IV,82; US and Mexico General Claims Commission,
Harry Roberts Claim, United Nations, Reportsof InternationalArbitralAwards, 1927, IV,
77; see, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment
Protection 269 RECUEIL DES COURs, 255, 347 (1997).
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obligation for the host State to adopt all reasonable measures to physically protect
assets and property from threats or attacks that may target particularly foreigners
or certain groups of foreigners. This means that there is a general obligation under
international customary law for the host State to exercise due diligence in the
protection of foreign investment as opposed to creating 'strict liability', which
would render a host State liable for any destruction of the investment, even if
caused by persons whose acts could not be attributed to the State.
There are also rules of customary international law that govern the
circumstances in which wrongfulness of conduct under international law
may be precluded and provide defences for States to justify investment treaty
breaches. These defences have been codified in the United Nations International
Law Commission's [Hereinafter, "ILC"] Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts [Hereinafter, "ILC Articles"]. That is not to say that
the ILC Articles are a treaty or even part of customary law by themselves. Rather,
they are the "learned and systematic expression of the development of the law ... by
decisions of courts and tribunals and other sources along a period of time". 8

These defences are only one aspect of a State's overall defence and do not
cover the entirety of a State's legal and factual defences. There is no exhaustive list
of defences and they can be invoked, even in the absence of a specific provision
in an investment treaty, as they are recognised as part of international customary

law. If a State defence is evidenced, the State will be excused from its obligations
even if the investor proves that, prima facie, the State has breached an international
obligation. However, the defences have varying degrees of effect as some defences
will excuse the State permanently, some will only provide temporary excuse by
suspending the obligation, and others will fully exonerate the State by annulling
the agreement containing the obligation.
This paper will examine the most commonly invoked State defences that
have proved successful, illustrated by landmark ICSID decisionsY. The successful
defences to be discussed below areforce majeure and necessity. Less successful and
infrequently used State defences such as consent, bribery, international public
17
18
19

Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fairand EquitableTreatment Standardin InternationalInvestment
Law, OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, Number 2004/3, 9. See
also, R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, BILATERAL INVFSTMENT TREATIES (1995),
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets v. Argentina, at 124 (ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award of 22 May 2007).
Alexis Martinez, Invoking State Defences in Investment TreatyArbitrationin Waibel et al.
(eds.), at 315, 315-17 (2010).
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policy, legitimate exercise of sovereignty, self-defence and distress will not be
discussed here. All of these State defences are separate to the legal rights created for
investors and host States under BITs and treaty-based law, and these two sources
of law should not be conflated.
(i) Force majeure
Force majeure is the notion that a State may defend itself if its conduct, even

if prima facie in breach of an international obligation, was coerced or compelled
by external events outside the State's control. Force majeure is codified in Article
23 of the ILC Articles, precluding the acts of a State in non-conformity with an
international obligation if the act is due to the occurrence of an 'irresistible force's
or of an 'unforeseen event "21 that is 'beyond the control of the State', making it
'materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation' 2There are
two exceptions where Article 23 does not apply, that is, where the situation of force
majeure is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of
the State invoking it or the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring.3
The effect of force majeure clauses depends in each case on the words used in
the clause. The courts generally give force majeure clauses a narrow construction,
and apply the "presumption that the expression force majeure is likely to be restricted
to superveningevents which arise without thefault of either party andfor which neitherof
them has undertaken responsibility".24Such events may include (but are not limited

to) fire, flood, atmospheric disturbances, storm, tornado, earthquake, epidemic,
war, riots, strike, lockouts, civil war, terrorism, revolution, military or usurped
power or similar unforeseen circumstances and acts beyond the control of the
parties. In addition, parties generally have an obligation to mitigate the effects of
a force majeure event.
The consequences of force majeure depend upon the relevant circumstances
and the applicable contractual provisions. Often force majeure will delay the

20

Article 23, iLC Articles. An irresistible force is defined as "a constraintwhich the State
was unable to avoid or oppose by any means".
21 Article 23, ILC Articles. An unforseen event is one that is "neither foreseen nor easily
foreseeable".
22 Article 23, ILC Articles. Materially impossible is qualified with the Statement that "a
more difficult performance is not sufficient,for example in case of political oreconomic crisis".
23 Article 23, 2(i) and (ii), ILC Articles.
24 Fyffes Group Ltd v. Reefer Express Lines Ltd (The Kriti Rex), [199612 Lloyd's Rep 171.
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performance of an obligation or entitle the delayed party to an extension of time
for performance. A contract may include provisions aimed at ensuring performance
in case of force majeure. If force majeure conditions prevent performance or delay it
for an extended period of time, the contract may be terminated. The rationale for
these termination clauses is that the essential purpose of the contract will at some
point be frustrated if the contracted work cannot be undertaken for an extended
period. Forcemajeureis yet to be successfully argued in investment treaty arbitration.
However, it was successfully invoked in a number of claims in the Iran-US Claim
Tribunal set up in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution to handle claims
of American investors against Iran2 5
More recent instances of whereforce majeure may potentially be raised include
the political upheaval in Libya that has cast uncertainty over Libya's oil and gas
industry, with each side in the developing civil war claiming to be in control of
the country's oil fields, pipelines and ports. The civil unrest, trade and financial
sanctions imposed by the EU, US and others, as well as the UN-sanctioned no-fly
zone, forced many foreign companies doing business in Libya to evacuate their
expat employees and assess their legal rights and obligations in respect of their
ongoing business operations in the country. Foreign companies that are involved
in Libyan projects and transactions may in turn attempt to extricate themselves
from burdensome contracts, meaning that disputes regarding the interpretation
of force majeure and price review clauses are inevitable. Investors will need issues
to be addressed promptly in accordance with rights and obligations stipulated by
contracts and applicable laws. Similarly, investors with significant investments in
India may be faced with the same challenges following events such as cyclones,
earthquakes, hailstorms and rains that sometimes devastate significant areas of
the country.
(i) Necessity
Most frequently invoked by States in times of crisis, a State may be excused
from its obligations in exceptional circumstances where it can demonstrate that it
was acting out of necessity. 26 The doctrine of necessity is a well-grounded concept
25

26

See, Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence of Iran, Interlocutory
Award No., ITL 24-29-2 (Jul. 27, 1983); Amoco International Finance Corporation v.
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award (Jul. 14, 1987), 15 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 189; Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. The Islamic Republic of Iran &the
National Iranian Oil Company, Award (Jun. 29, 1989), 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib, Rep. 79.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J. REPORTS 7 (1997), Judgment,
at 1 51-52 (Sep. 25, 1997).
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in customary international law and has been codified into Article 25 of the ILC
Articles? According to Article 25, necessity arises where there is an irreconcilable
conflict between an essential interest on the one hand and an international
obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other.
Necessity will only be available to excuse non-performance of an obligation
where it meets the four strict criteria in order to safeguard against possible abuse."
These criteria are, that the State's act was to safeguard an 'essential interest', that
the peril it was guarding against was 'grave and imminent', that the course of
action was the 'only option available' and that no other 'essential interests' were
seriously impaired as a result of the breach. Regarding the meaning of the term
'essential interest', the ILC has observed that "the extent to which a given interest
is 'essential' depends on all the circumstances and cannot be prejudged" and that "it
extends to particularinterests of the State and its people, as well as of the international

community as a whole". "- The term 'essential interests' can encompass not only
the existence and independence of a State itself, but also other subsidiary but
nonetheless 'essential' interests, such as the preservation of the State's broader
social, economic and environmental stability, and its ability to provide for the

fundamental needs of its population.? The ICJ has defined 'peril' as requiring an
element of 'risk', as opposed to material damage having already been occurred,
and must be established (an 'apprehension of possible peril' is not sufficient))?
According to the Draft Articles, 'only option available' means that the defence may

not be invoked if a State has other lawful means to preserve the interest, even if
those means are 'more costly or less convenient'.'

27

DraftArticles on Responsibilityof StatesforInternationallyWrongftI Acts in REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THur WORK OF ITS Ft'iy-Tu|R

28

29
30
31

at 11 51-52 (Sep. 25, 1997).
32

SESSION,

UN GAR,

56th Sess, Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
Articles on State Responsibility, reporting in The International Law Commission's
articles on State responsibilities: introduction text and commentaries, James Crawford
(ed.) THE INTERNAIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 61 (2002); see also, U.N. GAOR, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc.
A/CNA/517 (Apr. 2, 2001).
See, ILC Commentary to Article 25, at
5-9 (discussing cases where an 'essential
interest' at stake ranged from economic stability to the natural environment).
See, ILC Commentary to Article 25, at 11 5-9.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), LC.J. Reports 7 (1997), Judgment,
ILC Commentary to Art 25, at [15.
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The party pleading the defence must meet the significant burden of proving
that it should be allowed to justify its failure to perform its valid international
obligations under the BIT on grounds of necessity. 33There are two exceptions where
the defence is not available; that is, where the State has renounced the defence so as
to exclude the possibility of invoking the defence or where the State has contributed
to the situation of necessity. A State's contribution to its situation of necessity need
not be specifically intended or planned and can be the consequence, inter alia, of
well-intended but ill-conceived policies." In contrast to force majeure, necessity
does not require the State to be coerced or compelled but involves an element of
free will. Importantly, the defences are not self-judging and are subject to a good
faith review by the tribunal. It is also noteworthy that necessity merely permits
otherwise non-permitted behaviour for the duration of the circumstances causing
necessity. Upon termination of those circumstances, the obligations revive. 35
The doctrine of necessity has been used successfully in, and has generally been
accepted by, the international community for cases of military and environmental
crisis. For example in AAPL v. Sri Lanka,6 military necessity was assessed by the
tribunal in relation to acts of the Sri Lankan security forces executing a counterinsurgency operation during which the investment (a prawn farm) was destroyed.
The tribunal held that the force deployed by the army had been excessive and
found Sri Lanka responsible.
Necessity has also been invoked in times of economic crisis. Although
some scholars question the use of the doctrine for economic necessity, the ICSID
recently expressed in a handful of cases that the doctrine of necessity could be
used as a defence to preclude wrongdoing in cases of economic emergencies,
thereby silencing any criticism that it can only be applied in cases of military or
environmental disasterY In both the LG&E and Continental Casualty cases, the
tribunal found that the defence of necessity is only justified when measures are
essential for safeguarding essential public interests, and in light of the aggregate of
devastating economic, political and social conditions, this requirement is satisfied.
33
34

ILC Commentary to Chapter V ('Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness'), at I S.
Impregilo S.p.A v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award of June
21 2011).

35

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), l.C.J. Reports 7 (1997), Judgment,
at 1 101 (Sep. 25, 1997).

36
37

AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award of 21 June 1990, 4 ICSID REPORTS 246 (1997).
Eric D. Kasenetz, DesperateTimes callfor Desperatemeasures: the Aftermath ofArgentina's
State of Necessity and the Current Flight of the ICSID 41 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
INIEIRNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 709, 710, 721 (2010).

Investor-StateArbitration in Times of Crisis
The tribunals in Sempra and Enron rejected the defence of necessity as it was not
one that compromised the very existence of the State and its independence. These
subsequent rulings suggest that the defence of necessity, while available, may not
necessarily be relied upon when dealing with sovereign financial crisis.
B. Treaty Protections
Apart from the customary international law doctrines outlined above, there
are certain standards of protection found within most BITs that protect investors.
The key feature of most BITs is a focus on detailed standards of treatment, that is,
the obligation of the host State as to treatment which investors are entitled and the
provision for the settlement of disputes through direct investor-State arbitration.
Certain standards of protection can be found under most international investment
agreements, are frequently invoked by investors in arbitrations and are construed
in accordance with international law.3s
(i) Substantive standards of protection - MFN and NT Clauses
There are two major substantive standards for protection in most BITs. These
are the Most Favoured Nation Treatment [Hereinafter, "MFN"] and National
Treatment [Hereinafter,"NT"] clauses.
The obligation to afford MFN treatment generally requires that investors
from that State receive treatment no less favourable than the treatment enjoyed by
investors from other States. Similarly, the NT obligations are usually expressed in
such a way as to entitle investors to treatment that is 'not less favourable' than the
treatment that is accorded to nationals or companies of the host State.
The effects of including such obligations in a BIT are pertinent as an investor
can generally rely on the MFN provision in its treaty to obtain more beneficial
treatment than the host State may have agreed to grant investors from another
State, in a different BIT. There are divergent views as to whether an MFN clause in
a BIT should apply only to substantive standards of protection, or whether it also
extends to any additional procedural rights, such as an investor-State arbitration
provision. 9 There seems to be no resolution to this issue as it depends largely on
the wording of the particular MFN provision in the relevant BIT.40

38
39

40

Brown, supra note 1, at 59, 62-66.
Brown, supra note 1, at 59, 62-66. See also, Maffezizi v. Spain, 64 (ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000), in contrast to Salini Costruttori
SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Jordan, at 114 (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 29 November 2004).
Brown, supra note 1, at 59, 65.
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An interesting investor-State arbitration case which relied heavily upon the
MFN provision of one of India's BIrs was decided in November 2011, when the
arbitral tribunal in White IndustriesAustraliaLtd v. Republic of India held India to be
liable to the Australian foreign investor on the ground of a breach of its BIT with
Australia. The Australian and Indian governments signed a BIT in 1999 which
included 17 articles aimed at protecting and encouraging the investments that
investors from each State might make in the other State's territory.4
In 1989, White Industries entered into an agreement with Coal India Limited,
an Indian company, for the provision of services relating to the development of
one of Coal India's mines. Various disputes arose over the years that followed,
culminating in a referral to arbitration in 1999. A final award favouring White
Industries in respect of the disputes was rendered in 2002, at which point White
Industries began proceedings in the Indian courts to have the award enforced.
The Australian corporation was met with considerable resistance in its attempts,
however, which resulted from the combination of both the various applications
from Coal India to have the award set aside and the continued delay of the court
system.
After nine years of persistence, the award was still yet to be enforced. White
Industries thus brought an action against India in arbitration, arguing that the
excessive delay it experienced in having its award enforced in the Indian courts
violated the India-Australia BIT. Central to White Industries' claim was that the
Indian courts had failed to enforce the award in a timely manner and consequently
had failed in providing it an "effective means of assertingclaims andenforcing rights"Y2
The curious aspect of this argument was that no provision in the India-Australia
BIT mentioned or included such a duty for either of the states as hosts to foreign
investments.
In presenting its argument, White Industries relied upon the MFN clause in
the India-Australia BIT to draw into play a provision to this effect from the BIT
that India had entered into with Kuwait. Article 4.2 of the India - Australia BIT
contained the relevant MFN clause and provided that a "ContractingParty shall
at all times treat investments in its own territory on a basis no less favourable than that
accorded to investments of investors of any third country".
41

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT

REPUELIC OF INDIA ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS

OF THE

(26 February

1999).
42

AR ICLEi.,
AGREEMENT BETWEEN T14E STATE OF KUWAIT AND THE RiPUBLIC OF INDIA FOR
THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT (27 November 2001).
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This MFN clause enabled the Australian corporation to use the 'effective
means' provision of the India-Kuwait BIT to its advantage; the tribunal concluded
that the delay by Indian courts had caused India to breach its BIT with Australia,
and White Industries was awarded approximately AUD 4 million.
Apart from having produced the only publicly known award secured against
India, this case is important for several other reasons. First, it puts considerable
pressure on the Indian government to make a concerted effort to reform its judicial
system so as to ensure the more efficient enforcement of arbitral awards. Second,
there is some evidence to suggest that the decision has opened the floodgates for
other foreign investors to pursue similar claims against India if they encounter
lengthy delays or other difficulties in enforcing their award. By way of example,
February 2012 saw Sistema JSFC, a Russian conglomerate, submit a formal notice
to India threatening international arbitration proceedings under the India-Russia
BIT if the Indian government failed to settle a dispute related to the revocation of
its telecom licences within six months.43
(iii)

General standards of protection - FET, Full-Protection and Security
and Umbrella Clauses

Some general standards of protection can be found in clauses such as 'Fair
and Equitable Treatment' [Hereinafter, "FET"I; minimum international level of
protection; Full Protection and Security; and Respect of Host State's Contracts
(more commonly known as an 'Umbrella Clause').
FET clauses will be breached if the host State acts in a way that is 'arbitrary,
grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic' or engages in 'discriminatory'" conduct
or acts in a way that is inconsistent with the investor's legitimate expectations. 45
There may also be requirements to maintain a stable business environment that is
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Sistema threatensarbitrationin 2G case, in TIiE TIMEs oF INDIA (28 February, 2012), available
at ht p://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Sistema-threatensarbitration-in-2G-case/articeshow27O637cms (Last visited on 30 July 2013).
Waste Management, Inc v. Mexico (No2), at 98 (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00!3,
Award of 30 April 2004).
See, Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. Mexico, at 154 (ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003); see also, M FD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile
SA v Chile, TI 1I1-I5 (ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award of 25 May 2004); Saluka
Investments BV v. Czech Republic, at 11 300-8 (UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award
of 17 March 2006).
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consistent with reasonable investor expectations.,w A few tribunals have recently
noted the close link between the FET standard and the notion of legitimate
expectations, as well as the need to balance investors' expectations with the right
of host States to regulate in the public interest in applying the FET standardY
The obligation to provide 'full protection and security' is concerned primarily
with failures of the State to provide physical protection for the investor's property
and protect it from actual damage, either caused by State officials, or by the actions
of others where the State has failed to exercise due diligence.48 However, it has
also been interpreted as extending beyond mere physical protection to requiring
the host State to provide legal protection for the investor's rights.
Umbrella clauses provide additional protection to investors in that they
elevate any breaches, by the host State, of its contractual obligations to the status
of a breach of international law. They are generally formulated in broad terms as
requiring the host State to observe any obligation it may have entered into with
regard to the investment of nationals or companies of the other contracting party.4 9
The effect of the umbrella clause, although there are divergent views in the case
law, is to elevate to the international plane, any contractual obligation that the host
State may owe the investor as well as, arguably, any obligations that might exist
under domestic legislation.?
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See e.g., LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Award 2003; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed
SA v. Mexico, at 154 (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003).
Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, at 1 264 (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 January 2010); AWG v. Argentina, at 1 226 (ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010).
See, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Sri Lanka, at I'l 78-86 (ICSID Case No.
ARB187/3, Award of 27 June 1990); Wena Hotels Ltd v. Egypt, at 1 84-95 (ICSID Case
No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000).
See e.g., Artide 111(3) AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF BRUNEI DARUSSAIAM, THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, MAIA)YSIA, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REPUBLIC OF
SINGAPORE, AND THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND FoR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF

INVESTMENTS (15 December 1987) 27 ILM 612; Article 10(2), CHINESE MODEL BIT; Article
8(2), GERMAN MODEL BIT (2005); Article 2(2), UK MODEL BIT. Furthersee, Andrew P.
Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTM ENT TREATIES: STANDARDS
OF TREATMEN, 437 (2009).
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See, Noble Ventures, Inc v. Romania, at 11 51-61 (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award
of 12 October 2005); SGS Societe General de Surveillance SA v. Philippines, at 1 115,
121, 128 (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004).
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(iv)

Expropriation

There are also some non-contingent standards included in most BITs such
as protection in case of expropriation through compensation. Expropriation
clauses protect foreign investors by ensuring that host States may not arbitrarily
take ownership of their investments in the absence of certain conditions, without
the payment of adequate compensation. Most BITs provide that expropriation
can be 'direct' or 'indirect' and includes 'measures having effect equivalent to
expropriation', or measures 'tantamount' to expropriation.51 Thus it is broader
than just the physical seizure of assets and includes indirect measures that
amount to expropriation, the right to outwards transfer of funds (such as profits
and divestment) and management of investments in host country provisions.
Expropriation may also include changes in law or policy that substantially detracts
from the value of an investment.
(v)

ISDR or Arbitration Clause

There are investor-State dispute resolution [Hereinafter, "ISDR"J provisions
in most BITs providing for direct arbitration by aggrieved foreign investors, as an
alternative to the host State's national courts, to ensure impartiality and parity.
Most treaties allow the investor to choose arbitration under a number of different
fora and arbitral rules for the prosecution of its claims. The most frequently selected
options are for the arbitration to proceed either under the rules of the ICSID or the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
(vi)

NPM Clause

In addition to these protections for investors, many BITs contain nonprecluded measures [Hereinafter,"NPM' clauses designed to limit the applicability
of investor protections in exceptional circumstances. NPM provisions may appear
either in the main treaty text or in the attached protocol, though they are more
often found in the body of the treaty itself. The NPM provisions allow countries
to take measures inconsistent with their treaties when, for example, their actions
are necessary "for the protection of essential security, the maintenance of public order,
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See e.g., GERMAN MODEL BIT, Art 4(2); UK MoDEL BIT, Art 5(1). See also, AWG v. Argentina
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010) 134; Chemitura v.
Canada, at 1 247 (Award, Ad hoc NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, 2
August 2010); RoslnvestCo v. Russia, at 249, SCC Arbitration V (079/2005) Final
Award, 12 September 2010.
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or to respond to a public health emergency". Despite textual variation, NPM clauses
share several structural elements. First, they require a link between the measures
adopted by the host State that might breach the treaty and the permissible objectives
of States in the provisions. This isknown as the 'nexus' requirement. Second, they
define the breadth, or 'scope' of the NPM clause's application vis-a-vis the other
treaty provisions. NPM clauses can either be drafted so as to apply to an entire BIT
or can be written in a more limited form so that they apply only to a subset of the
treaty's substantive provisions. Third, they list the 'permissible objectives' in the
pursuit of which measures deviating from other substantive treaty provisions are
not precluded by the BIT. The most commonly found permissible objectives include
security, international peace and security, public order, public health and public
morality. Some less frequently occurring objectives include'extreme emergency',53
"relating to the conservationof living or non-living exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictionson domestic production or
consumption"4and "ensuring the integrity and stabilityof a contractingparty'sfinancial
TM
Collectively, these three structural elements determine whether States or
system".
investors will bear the costs of State action in exceptional circumstances 6
As long as the host State's actions are taken in pursuit of one of the permissible
objectives specified in the NPM clause, acts otherwise prohibited by the treaty do
not constitute breaches of the treaty and States should face no liability under the
BIT. If an NPM defence is successful, it can mean the State avoids international
liability and paying damages. India is one of the few countries that has included
NPM clauses since the beginning of the BIT program in the early 1980s. Exceptional
circumstances covered by such clauses can include financial crises, terrorist threats,
public health emergencies and other such crisis situations. NPMs limit the legal
regime protecting foreign investors and bring into question whether BITs really
52
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provide as strong a form of investor protection as they have been understood to
provide in the past.
The interpretation and application of NPM clauses is critical to determining
both State freedom to respond to crisis situations and the scope of investment
protections accorded under a BIT.

IV.

PRE-EMPTIVE MEASURES AND ALLOCATING RISK

There are a number of measures that investors and host States can take at the
negotiation phase of a BIT to pre-emptively address the situation where a crisis may
happen in the future by allocating risk. A full discussion on the most successful
fiscal policies for governments to employ and the most effective ways of drafting
BITs is beyond the scope of this article. However, below are some suggested relevant
risk mitigation strategies for times of crisis that have been at the centre of recent
discourse in the field. First, strategies that can be employed by investors will be
explored, followed by strategies that may be engaged by host States.
A. Investors
Typically Model BITs afford the variety of protections outlined above to
quali fing investors who make an investment into the host country, against
improper interference from the host State. Common protections include NT, MFN,
FET, full protection and security, expropriation and umbrella clauses.
Apart from these protections, taking out political risk insurance is another
option for investors in order to guard against the potential outbreak of crisis.
Political risk insurance will generally cover expropriation, currency inconvertibility
and non-transfer risk, and political violence, including war and civil war. While
expropriation and non-transfer are generally addressed within the BIT, political
violence and the associated risk of civil unrest are rarely addressed. As a result,
political risk insurance can be an important measure to protect investors from these
perils. Political risk insurance comes in a number of forms, from merely insuring
the obligations under the BIT to more extensive and broader coverage. A commonly
accepted general rule is that starting with a broader political risk insurance policy
is prudent, as layers can always be stripped away as the project develops and the
7
risks become better understood.
57

Daniel Galvao, PoliticalRisk Insurance: Project FinancePerspectiveand New Developments
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As an alternative, or in addition, to an investment treaty, investors and hosts
States can bargain contractually over the allocation of regulatory risk. Specifically,
they can include a stabilisation clause in host government contracts, which commit
governments to not alter regularly frameworks in a way that undermines the
economic viability of the investment. A stabilisation clause can be demanded as a
condition of an investment contract by investors who want to allocate risk. Such
agreements can also provide that the government must pay compensation in the
event of a material change in law or regulation affecting the investor. Moreover,
they can make such contracts enforceable through international arbitration, thus
avoiding dependence on the domestic court system in the host country. Despite
the enormous amount of controversy over BITs and their effects on regulatory
autonomy, there has been very little attention to stabilisation clauses. s Yet such
clauses are used extensively, particularly in the case of investments in extractive
industries, infrastructure and the energy sector. 9 The downside is that investment
contracts can involve considerable transaction costs and such contracts are much
less feasible for smaller investors or projects.
B. States
States may take measures to counter undesired expansive interpretations
of the definition of expropriation, equitable treatment and the ambit of the MFN
clause, by arbitral tribunals in investor-State arbitrations. States may attempt to
make their definitions clearer by providing, for example, more specific guidelines
about the content of each concept when drafting their investment treaties. If such
drafting measures are effectively implemented by more States, investors may find it
increasingly harder to make successful claims under investment law in these areas.
The use of an NPM clause is also an effective pre-emptive step that a State
can take at the drafting phase of a BIT. In the field of international investment law,
it is unreasonable to conclude that States ever intend through BIT provisions to
renounce or at least substantially curtail their right to guarantee public order or
pursue fundamental society goals whenever foreign investors' rights are affected.6
Therefore the use of NPM provisions, where the State expressly reserves its right
to adopt measures to protect certain essential interests, are an effective form of
58
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Robert Howse, Freezing government policy: Stabilization clauses in investment contracts
1(3) INVe5TMENT TREATY NEws 3, 3 5 (2011).
Id,
T. J. Grierson Weiler, INVESTMENT TEATY ARTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 146
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risk mitigation for host States. NPM provisions are a well-known feature of BITs
concluded by India, as well as other countries such as the USA, Germany and
Canada.
However, the application of such provisions can raise considerable
controversy, Generally, States should keep in mind recent ICSID decisions and
adopt an NPM clause that is likely to provide them with the flexibility they need
to deal with emergencies and crisis situations. 61 More specifically, States entering
agreements should protect themselves by expressly stating their intent in the text
of the treaty Le. whether the NPM clause is subject to self-judgement or requires
review by the arbitral tribunal. Delimiting the scope of a NPM is a crucial policy
challenge. The BITs that have been found to be the most explicitly self-judging
have been that of the USA and tend to use the term 'measures necessary for' in
relation to the nexus of the NPM, list permissible objectives of "essential security
interests, internationalpeace and security, public order and public morals" and are
comprehensive rather than limited by using language such as 'this Treaty shall
not preclude' to describe scope. In contrast, the language used by Indian B3s in
relation to nexus, permissible objectives and scope has tended to be presumptively
not self-judging. Indian BITs have used phrases such as "that have to be taken for"
rather than 'necessary for' to expressly limit the scope of the NPM. 62
Beyond drafting techniques, there are also steps that States can take to mitigate
crisis at the fiscal policy level. There is new evidence in the field of economics
showing that capital controls are an effective macro-prudential measure that
nation States should employ as part of their economic policy in order to prevent
and mitigate financial crisis.3 Capital flows can help developing countries such
as India grow rapidly but they tend to be pro-cyclical in their tendency to come
quickly when times are good and leave swiftly during a downturn. In a crisis,
capital controls can help smooth the inflow and outflows of capital and protect
developing economies. Most controls target highly short-term capital flows,
usually conducted for speculative purposes. For example, Columbia's 2007 capital
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Eric D. Kasenetz, DesperateTimes CallforDesperateMeasures:The Aftermath ofArgentina's
State of Necessity and the Current Fight in the ICSID 41 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
INTMIRNATIONAL LAw REvipw 709, 736 (2010).
Burke-White and von Staden, supra note 56, at 336-342.
Kevin P. Gallagher, Reforming United States trade and investment treatiesfor financial
stability: The case of capital controls 1(3) 11SD INvesTMENT TREATY NEWS 3, 9-11 (April
2011). See also, Bruno Coelho and Kevin P. Gallagher, CapitalControlsand 21st Century
Financial Crisis Evidence from Columbia and Thailand PERI WORKING PAtER No. 213,
January 2010.
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controls required foreign investors to park a percentage of their investment in the
central bank, which helped that nation escape some of the damage from the Global
Financial Crisis [Hereinafter,"GFC"]. Likewise, in the wake of the GFC, States such
as Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand all used capital control
to stem the massive inflows of speculative investment entering their economies
and prevent the wreaking of havoc on their exchange rates and asset markets.
South Korea, for example, has direct limits on foreign exchange speculation and
has levied an outflows tax on capital gains of foreign purchases of government
bonds. In a recent International Monetary Fund [Hereinafter,"IMF"I study, it was
found that capital controls such as these have helped OECD countries buffer some
of the worst effects of the GFC.6 The IMF now endorses capital controls as part of
the macroeconomic policy toolkit and has recommended that a system of global
coordination be put in place for capital controls, an initiative that the IMF, with
the support of the G-20, is continuing to develop.65
As an extreme measure, States have the option to do what Australia has
recently done. The Australian federal government issued a trade policy in April
2011 based on a report from the Productivity Commission, to no longer include
Investor-State Dispute Settlement [Hereinafter,"ISDS"] provisions in future BITs
and Regional Trade Agreements [Hereinafter, "RTAs"].6 The policy was justified
by reference to the principles of 'no greater rights' for foreign investors and the
Governments' right to regulate to protect the public interest. The implications
are that countries with which Australia enters future trade agreements will most
likely have to pursue claims against the host government through diplomatic
channels, inter-State claims or before the national courts under national law. This
is a questionable policy as, while it perhaps ensures greater State sovereignty, it
may be a difficult position for Australia to maintain in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement [Hereinafter, "TPPA"] negotiations, particularly given the pressure
that is likely to come from the USA. The policy also leaves Australian companies
investing off-shore vulnerable as it means they will not benefit from a suite of
64 Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R.Ghosh et al., CapitalInflows: The Role of Control, IMF
POSITION NOTE,
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65 G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, G20 Coherent Conclusionsfor the
Management of CapitalFlows Drawing on CountryExperiences (15 October 2011) available

at http://wwwg20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-finance-capital-flows-i1015-en.pdf (Last
visited on 30 July 2013); IMF, Liberalizing CapitalFlows and ManagingOutflows (13 March
2012) am;ilableat http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/ppeng2012/31312.pdf (Last visited
on 30 July 2013).
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Australian treaties with such provisions, particularly if they are investing in nonASEAN emerging markets with unstable political climates and less developed
legal systems where judicial bias and corruption is unknown. The Policy Statement
makes clear that Australian investors must assess (and protect against) the risk for
themselves. Thus the policy is by all accounts a double-edged sword and, some
have suggested, somewhat retrograde.
V. WHEN CRISIS STRIKES - POSSIBLE
REACTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
C. States
It is important for States to carefully consider the measures they take after
a crisis has broken out, especially if they are likely to affect foreign investments
and breach the provisions of any BITs they may be signatory to. Depending on the
steps a State takes, they may amount to breaches of BITs thus inviting arbitration
claims against them, and the steps used may preclude their ability to use certain
customary defences.
The actions of States in coping with the GFC and other financial crises have
generally been aimed at containing the contagion, minimising losses to society,
restoring confidence in financial institutions and instruments and lubricating the

economic system in order for it to return to full operation. Some typical measure
that are taken by governments in times of financial crisis include domestic stimulus
packages to prevent recession, increased government spending, decreased taxes,
infrastructure development, lower interest rates, capital controls and expropriation.
At the Euro area Summit on October 12,2008, Euro area countries along with
the UK urged all governments to adopt a common set of principles to address the
financial crisis. The measures the nations supported are largely in line with those

adopted by the UK and include:
0

Recapitalisation: governments fund banks that might be struggling to raise
capital and pledge to pursue wide-ranging restructuring of the leadership
of those banks that are turning to the government for capital.
State ownership: governments buy shares in the banks that are seeking
recapitalisation.
Govefrnent-debt guarantees: guarantees offered for any new bets, including
inter-bank loans, issued by the banks in the Euro zone area.
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Improved regulations: governments implement and encourage regulations
to permit assets to be valued on their risk of default instead of their current
market price.6
These measures are perhaps some of the more globally accepted responses.
One of the critical questions for States is whether these emergency measures could
amount to a violation of ILA obligations. Whether the response of a State during
times of financial crisis will trigger claims from investors is largely dependent on
the extent of the damage to investors and the degree to which there were more
desirable options available to the host State.
There are a number of IIA provisions that are most commonly affected
by crisis which are found to be breached through emergency measures taken
by States. Expropriation clauses are one such commonly affected provision as
there are cases where emergency measures amount to an expropriation and give
rise to compensation entitlements to the investor. FET clauses are another such
provision and tribunals often interpret them broadly to mean a breach of 'legitimate
expectation' of investors will amount to a breach of the provision. The principle of
non-discrimination or NT provisions also may be triggered by measures such as
State aid programmes and individual rescue packages, which favour domesticallyowned companies.
The most notable example of measures taken by States after a crisis that
was problematic, of which perhaps some lessons can be drawn, are the measures
taken by Argentina through the enactment of the Public Emergency Laws in
2002. Most cases filed against Argentina have targeted three main areas of the
Emergency Laws: the institution of provincial taxes, contrary to the concessions,
the Economic Emergency Law on the pesication of charges (that is the freezing
of charges for public services) and the application of petroleum export retentions
in 2002." In the CMS case, the claimant successfully argued that the emergency
legislation had violated Article IH(2) of the US-Argentina BIT by breaching the
FET clause and non-discrimination provisions and that the Government had
expropriated gas investments in TGN without full compensation. Likewise in
67
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the LG&E case, the tribunal accepted LG&E's claim that the suspension of the tax
regime in the gas sector breached the FET standard and umbrella clause contain
the BIT. Similarly in the Enron case, the tribunal found that "Argentina went too
far by completely dismantling the very legalframework constructed to attract investors"
which in turn amounted to "an objective breach of thefair and equitable treatment due
under the treaty".69
Another essential concern for States is that should the means by which they
choose to mitigate the crisis later be found by an arbitral tribunal to have not only
breached, but'contributed' to the crisis, this may work to defeat a necessity defence.
For example, in National Grib PLC v. Argentine Republic,7 another claim arising
from the Argentinean financial crisis and brought by an electrical power company,
the tribunal rejected Argentina's reliance on the necessity defence, finding that
Argentina had made a 'substantial' contribution to the situation invoked and that
its response to the crisis 'further contributed to it'. Similarly the CMS tribunal ruled
that Argentina not only had other means available to respond to the crisis but had
significantly contributed to the crisis through the failing to give due consideration
7
to the 'shortcomings' of the Emergency Laws. 1
Likewise, States should ensure that they have exhausted all measures that
are not harmful to foreign investors before they take such measures, because
in the event of an investor-State dispute arising later, they will need to show
evidence that the harmful measure was the only option available in order to run
a successful necessity defence. As already noted, according to the Draft Articles,
'only option available' means that the defence must not be invoked if a State has
other lawful means to preserve the interest, even if those means are 'more costly
or less convenient'.
Declaring an official State of emergency can be a prudent action to take for
States in times of crisis if they want to rely on the doctrine of necessity as a defence.
In ContinentalCasualty v. Argentina,2 the tribunal noted that the fact that Argentina's
Congress declared a 'public emergency' in economic, financial, exchange, social and
69
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administrative matters in conformity with Article 76 of its Constitution, and enacted
a specific 'Public Emergency Law' to cope with the crisis, was "powerful evidence
of its gravity such as that could not be addressed by ordinary measures".73Interestingly,
this was found despite the fact that the BIT clause being invoked (Article XI) was
not self-judging, suggesting that the tribunal was willing to rely on Argentina's
own characterisation of the situation.
D. Investors
In the first instance, investors obviously have recourse to direct arbitration
provided that the BIT has an ISDR clause. They then have a variety of protections
within treaties and also under customary law that have been outlined above, to
base their claims upon. The success of their claim is dependent upon their ability
to meet the threshold of various standards of international law.
As an alternative to arbitration or recourse to nation courts of the host, the
remedy of "diplomatic protection" or an inter-State claim, whereby the investor's
home State can bring a claim on behalf of the investor against the host State before
the International Court of Justice is available, but it is very rarely used by States.
Investors may also consider suing States through alternative regimes, such as under
WTO law or a FTA services chapter. It must be noted that investors have no direct
right of standing in WTO disputes or disputes arising from FTA services chapters
because both provide only for inter-State dispute settlement mechanisms. However,
private investors who possess sufficient influence can lobby their governments
to initiate State-to-State dispute settlement proceedings at the WTO and under
an FTA services chapter in order to circumvent unfavourable developments in
investment law. However, the limitations of these options are that the home State
retains discretion and control over the claims process and the process is less likely
to be invoked for smaller investors or projects.
It is noteworthy then, that investors, especially those that do not have a great
deal of political influence or have less significant investments, have little recourse
against the actions of host States above and beyond investor-State arbitration.
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Id, at 1181.
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VI.

THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTOR-STATE

ARBITRATION AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
The withdrawal by the plurinational State of Bolivia and by Ecuador from
the ICSID as well as the termination of several BITs by Ecuador and some other
countries 74 raises novel and complex legal issues of systemic importance for the
international investment regime. It has been suggested that these withdrawals and
denunciations indicate that some countries no longer view ICSID or arbitration as
the preferred means of resolving investor-State disputes.7 This invites a broader
discussion on whether reform to the IIA system and the ICSID is needed.
The critics of ISDR tend to argue that BITs unduly favour the interests of
investors, The expropriation and FET provisions of BITs have resulted in host
States being forced to compensate investors, even for legitimate and public interest
regulatory change in times of crisis, including environmental and social regulations.
Moreover, ISDRs can limit a country's ability to efficiently restructure its debt
following a financial crisis as ISDR mechanisms can allow individual bond holders
to arbitrate against a host State attempting to legitimately rescue its economy. 6
Conversely, those who defend the system contend that in most instances
where investors have received compensation, governments have acted out of
regulatory opportunism, luring the investor into the country with promises of a
stable and favourable economic and legal framework, only to alter that framework
to the investor's disadvantage, or threaten to do so, in order to force renegotiation
of the terms and conditions of the investment that are more favourable to the host
State after the investment has already been established. Advocates of increased
investor protection argue that it is in the best interests of the host State and investors
to protect FDI as it will lead to stronger economies and more FDI for the host State.
74
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In 2008, Ecuador terminated nine BITs - with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania and Uruguay. Other
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With the recent EU report showing a clear inclination towards strengthening
host States power to regulate and implement policy choices without being
overburdened by treatified standards of investment protection,' countries like
Australia abolishing ISDR clauses from all future BITs and FTAs and South
American countries being faced with walking away from ICSID as their best
possible alternative to avoid complete economic ruin, it is undeniable that there
is a case for reform to the I!A system generally and ICSID arbitrations specifically.
A. Generalareas of reform in investor-State arbitration
(i) Refining the scope of "investment" in Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention
In order to establish jurisprudence over a dispute that has come before ICSID,
a tribunal must satisfy itself of the following four requirements pursuant to Article
25(1) of the ICSID Convention, namely that;
(i)

the dispute is a legal dispute;

(ii)

the dispute arises directly out of an 'investment';

(iii) the dispute is between a contracting State and a national of another contracting
State, and;
(iv) the parties to the dispute have consented in writing to submit it to ICSID.
The second requirement, that the dispute arises directly out of an investment,
is one jurisdictional condition that continues to provoke divergent approaches
and opposing views from arbitrators and commentator alike. Specifically, there is
debate surrounding whether an 'investment' should be understood and interpreted
objectively, as distinct from the definition of'investment' contained in the relevant
BIT, or whether the BIT should be relied on exclusively to illuminate the meaning
of'investment'. These two diverging approaches have been encapsulated in the
Salvors award and the Salvors Annulment Decision where the same set of facts
led to opposite findings on the presence of an 'investment'.7 In the initial award,
the tribunal favoured an objective meaning of investment that was ascertainable
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independently of how 'investment' was defined in the UK - Malaysia BIT. The
tribunal subsequently found that there was no 'investment' within the meaning
of the ICSID Convention. In contrast, the majority in the ad hoc Committee in the
Salvors Annulment Decision relied on the BIT as the sole interpretive source of
the meaning of 'investment' and found that an investment did exist. Subsequent
tribunals have been tasked with determining which of the two prevailing
approaches to apply.
This lack of a uniform approach to defining what constitutes an 'investment'
and where any outer limits of access to ICSID jurisdiction lie is problematic as it has
lead to inconsistency in ICSID decisions. Moreover, where too broad a jurisdictional
opening is allowed in relation to the definition of what constitutes an 'investment',
it can facilitate the initiation of vexatious claims by investors. Therefore reform is
needed to further refine the scope of an investment.
(ii) Balancing public welfare objectives and private investor interests

Critics of IIA argue that the current system of international investor
protections has granted excessive power to global corporations and in a number
of cases, powerful investors have exploited investor-State arbitration to undermine
democratic processes, often at the expense of vulnerable developing countries and
the environment. With climate change emerging at the forefront of government
policy around the world through various emissions trading initiatives, the latitude
afforded to multinationals and foreign investors by host States is being increasingly
questioned. On the other hand, there is evidence that agreeing to deals through
BITs that favour investors brings strong benefits for national economies and that
legal certainty through protections afforded to investors in BITs is paramount to
the functioning of private international law. It is suggested that policymakers
should weight up the benefits and shortfalls carefully before signing any BITs
and draft them in a way that ensures that foreign investment supports social and
environmental goals while guaranteeing the legal certainty of agreements in times
of crisis. To do this, they need to refled on the degree of policy flexibility they need
to maintain vis-h-vis foreign investors in order to promote sustainable development
and deal with political, social and economic emergencies.
The latest developments in the European Parliament seem to support the
notion that there is a global shift towards ensuring that States are not unduly
restrained from legislating in the public interest.w The landscape of investor
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protection through the EU is about to enter a period of major change as the Lisbon
Treaty has endowed the EU with an exclusive competence to negotiate and
conclude agreements on FDI. The resolution adopted on 6 April 2011 by the EU
Parliament based on a report by the Committee on International Trade, shows a
clear inclination towards weaker investment protection in future EU investment
treaties. 1 Instead the resolution emphasises the need to strengthen host States'
power to regulate and implement their policy choices in sensitive areas without
being overburdened by treatified standards of investors' protection. In particular,
the EU Parliament has called for a clearer definition of the protected investments
and investors, with the view that 'speculative' forms of investment shall not be
protected and that 'abusive practices' should be abolished. The resolution seeks
to frame NT and MFN clauses more precisely so as to focus on circumstances in
which foreign and national investors must operate. It also aims to reduce FET to
the minimum customary international law standard and to modify the provisions
protecting against direct and indirect expropriation in order to establish "a clear
andfair balance between public welfare objectives and private interests".
The resolution also emphasises that future EU agreements must 'respect
the capacity for public intervention' and highlights the desire to have various
restraining clauses. These include corporate social responsibility clauses, special
clauses to prevent the watering down of social and environmental legislation,
a reference to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and clauses
laying down the right of host States to regulate not only in the areas of national
security, public health and the environment, but also with regards to workers' and
consumers' rights, cultural diversity and industrial policy.
The EU Parliament seems willing to defend existing member States' BITs
against the latest attack from the Commission with regard to the necessary
transitional arrangements. It even expressly acknowledges the rights of investors
whose investments fall within the scope of those arrangements and emphasises
the importance of their legal certainty. However, when it comes to the future
investment policy of the EU,it is yet to be seen which direction the EU will proceed
on policy with regard to future investment agreements as well as to the treatment
of existing BITs that are in force between EU member States and third countries as
well as intra-EU BITs, which the EU Commission has openly purported to dislike.
Similarly, and perhaps more controversially, the Australian Federal
Government's new trade policy has emerged out of the feeling that local investors
81
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and citizens lose out to foreign investors in investor-State arbitration and that
investor protections in BITs can allow investors to unduly influence government
policy. Illustrative of this fear is the 27 June 2011 request for arbitration that was
made by Phillip Morris Asia against the Australian government, pursuant to the
1993 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of
Hong Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. The substance of
the claim was that Peter Morris alleged that proposed legislation mandating plain
packaging of cigarettes amounted to 'expropriation' of its trademarks (Article 6) and
possibly a violation of'fair and equitable treatment' obligations (Article 2(2)). This
case came as a sequel to Peter Morris's request against the Uruguayan government
under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT."' That case was seen by analysts as a test case
where Peter Morris chose a relatively small Latin American country for potentially
precedent-setting litigation instead of taking on major countries in the West that
have legislated with varying degrees of enthusiasm to discourage tobacco use.83
The manufacturer was perhaps emboldened by the perceived expectation that
Uruguay wouldn't have pockets deep enough to fight the case in an international
forum. With the action initiated against Australia, it seems that this prediction may
be reigning true. Interestingly, the Uruguayan tobacco legislation is less stringent
than the scheme proposed by the Australian Government so the outcome of the
case will be significant.
The examples of both the EU and Australia indicate that States are not
happy with a legal framework where the rights and expectations of investors
are prioritised over or interfere with the legitimate interests of the citizens of the
host States with little regard to the norms of human rights law, environmental
law, labour law, public health or sustainable development.M This issue is further
aggravated in the situation of investors who enter into agreements with developing
nations. On one hand investors/corporations or supporters of free trade claim that
strong investor protections help developing countries attract additional foreign
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investment, which in turn boosts economy and advances developmental aims.
On the other hand, it can be argued that granting excessive protections to foreign
investors does not guarantee more FDI and cripples a government's ability to ensure
that investment supports national goals. It also curtails the ability of governments
to prioritise the welfare of their citizens when responding to crisis.5 The lack of
symmetry in the current dispute settlement regime, with protection for investors
but not for host governments, appears unfair to host governments. It is perhaps
a product of the unequal bargaining power when powerful countries negotiate
treaties with developing countries. If investors had to face rigid enforcement of
their contracts, the odds are high that they would want some review of the system
in order to make it more responsive to changed or unforeseen circumstances.8
Thus there is a case to be made for the need for States and investors to
negotiate more sustainable investment agreements. At the moment the parties
negotiating the BITs and the tribunals interpreting them do not see investment
issues through a sustainable development lens and they do not generally include
provisions expressly relating to development, human rights or the environment
but perhaps this will have to change going forward. IIAs can also be used to
promote sustainable development policies in a number of ways. If the agreements
incorporate principles of sustainable development in their preambles and
objectives, and if they cite specific norms in the substantive provisions, then they
can be useful tools for ensuring that international investment contributes to the
protection of human rights, the environment, and achieving the development
objectives of developing countries! 7
(iii)

Reform to the ICSID

A number of positive reforms have already taken place and evince the
responsiveness of ICSID in addressing the needs of the international community.
These include the introduction of amicus briefs and increased transparency
through new rules that allow third parties to attend oral hearings. However, there
is still room for improvement, especially in regard to the problem of inconsistent
outcomes that have arisen out of ICSID decisions and the need for transparency
in cases where there is a clear public interest such as in times of crisis.
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(iv)

The Problem of Inconsistencies

A distinctive feature of investor-State arbitration is that a single crisis situation
within a country can give rise to a multitude of claims by investors. An unfortunate
consequence of the resulting proliferation of separate arbitrations is that tribunals
can reach very different conclusions on similar, or even identical issues.
A useful illustration of this problem arises from the Argentine economic crisis
between 1992 - 2002. As a result of that particular event, over 47 ICSID claims
were brought against Argentina to determine the question of whether the crisis
constituted a state of necessity. During this period there were legitimate concerns
that multiple cases brought against a single country based on a single measure
could lead to inconsistent awardsA
These anxieties crystallised with two different arbitrations brought against
Argentina, the first by CMS Gas Transmission Company" and the second by
LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, and LG&E International Inc.' In these
proceedings, the two tribunals reached opposite conclusions on the availability
of the necessity defence despite almost identical facts and pleadings 9 1 In CMS v.
Argentina, a state of necessity was held to not have prevailed during the period
in question because the situation was not severe enough to amount to necessity?2
Less than a year later, LG&E v. Argentina tribunal found that the same situation
93
did reach the level of a state of necessity.
The inconsistency of decisions is damaging because it undermines the
legitimacy and predictability of investor-State arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution, especially in times of crisis where multiple claims on the same facts are
commonplace. Since there is no accepted principle of stare decisis in investor-State
arbitration, tribunals are not bound to follow the decisions of earlier tribunals
where the present facts and issues are similar or identical. If inconsistency of awards
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causes parties to lose faith in investor-State arbitration, the utility of the system
is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the proliferation of proceedings arising
from a single issue creates significant inefficiencies where multiple tribunals are
constituted to decide similar questions.
(v) Possible Solutions
1) Consolidation of Proceedings
A potential solution to these problems is to consolidate similar proceedings
into a single arbitration. This would allow for related disputes to be heard together,
eliminating the possibility that separate tribunals will reach inconsistent awards on
similar facts. Further, this would circumvent the inefficiencies inherent in multiple
arbitrations on the same issue.
Commentators have proposed that consolidation may be achieved either
formally or informally." Formal consolidation involves joining two separate
proceedings to be heard by a single tribunal. Informal consolidation occurs when
the same panel of arbitrators is constituted to hear two separate proceedings. While
informal consolidation does not reduce the number of proceedings, it does provide
the benefit of a more uniform interpretation and application of legal rules to each
fact situation, improving the consistency and predictability of awards.
Neither the ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rules contain any
clear guidance relating to the formal consolidation of parallel arbitral proceedings.
As such, short of amending the ICSID Convention, which would be politically
extremely difficult, consolidation may be achieved through provisions in individual
investment treaties. This has been an emerging trend in the drafting of BITs and
FTAsP For example, Article 1126 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
[Hereinafter, "NAFTA"] provides for the consolidation of proceedings where a
tribunal specially constituted to determine the question "is satisfied that claims have
been submnitt d to arbitration. that have a question oflaw orfact in common".9 NAFTA
envisages that its investment provisions apply to "measures adopted or maintained
by a [State in relation to investors of another [Stater"' This notion of 'measures'
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is significant. Given this provision, Article 1126 should be read as allowing for
consolidation where the question of 'fact in common' is a single State measure."
Several subsequent BITs and FTAs have adopted similar consolidation
provisions premised on the rationale that "a State cannot be exposed to two opposite
decisions in regard to a same measure"." In addition to NAFTA, the 'same State
measure' principle has been adopted in:
*

Article 33 of the New United States Model BIT;

"

Article 32 of the New Canada Model BIT;

"

Article 10.24 of the Chile-USA FTA;

*

Article 10.24 of the Morocco-USA

*

Article 15.24 of the Singapore-USA FTA; and

*

Article G27 of the Canada-Chile FTA.

TA;

Informal consolidation has been used quite effectively in a number of cases as
a simple technique to overcome problems of inconsistency. Camuzzi v. Argetinall
and Sempra v. Argentina"0 were two technically separate arbitrations in which
the parties agreed to appoint the same panel of arbitrators to hear each dispute.
Both tribunals reached the same conclusion and relied on very similar reasoning
in deciding the question of their jurisdiction over their claims.'2 Furthermore,
the ICSID Secretariat has played a role in facilitating informal consolidation
104
of proceedings 0 3 For example, in the Salini v. Morocco arbitration, the ICSID
Secretariat recommended that the parties appoint the same panel of arbitrators
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as had already been appointed in a parallel arbitration concerning Morocco and
another Italian investor pursuant to the same BIT and concerning similar factsY
Although the procedures remained separate, the decisions reached by the identical
tribunals were consistent.
2) An ICSID appellate structure
The establishment of an appeals facility has been proposed as a solution
to increasing consistency of decisions, as it would open the possibility to review
arbitral decisions within the ICSID system. At present, there is no such provision
within the ICSID Convention.
All that exists is provision for an ad hoc committee to be constituted with
jurisdiction to annul an award on the grounds that: 10
"

the tribunal was not properly constituted;

*

the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;

"

there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal;

*

there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or

*

the award has failed to State the reasons on which it is based.

Advocates in favour of an ICSID appellate structure contend that the current
annulment provisions are insufficient to address the problem of inconsistency.
This is because none of the grounds for annulment are wide enough to allow for
appeal on the basis of inconsistency per seY. Inconsistency would not, without
more, constitute a valid ground upon which an award could be annulled.
An appellate structure would therefore fill this gap in the provisions of the
ICSID Convention. It would improve both the quality and consistency of awards by
reconciling inconsistent decisions at the appeals stage. As a more direct solution, the
establishment of an institutional appellate body under the ICSID Convention is seen
105 Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award of 22
December 2003).
106 Art 52(1), ICSID Convention, provides: "Eitherparty may request annulment of the award
by an application in writingaddressed to the Secretary-Geeral on one or more of thefollowing
grounds.. ,7
107 Christina Knahr, Annulment and Its Role in the Context of Confliling Awards in Waibel et
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as preferable to alternatives such as expanding the scope of annulment grounds
under Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention. Notice, however, should be paid to
the great political difficulty of amending the ICSID Convention. This clearly forms
a significant practical impediment to the realisation of such a reform proposal.

VII. CONCLUSION
There are lessons to be learnt from the jurisprudence of the ICSID over
the last decade in relation to which responses by governments in times of crisis
provoked claims against host States, and the most effective ways in which investors
can protect themselves in times of crisis. The global financial crisis led to a more
systematic approach by the international community in building a framework that
addresses the root causes of economic crisis. While measures like stimulus packages
provide short term relief, they run the risk of further encouraging moral hazards
and do not mitigate future risks. Initiatives like the G -20 forum, where discourse
is targeted towards the study and review of international financial stability and
regulation, represent an attempt at a global solution to a global problem. Likewise
with investment-arbitration, the framework is in need of reform both at a macro
level and specifically at the ICSID level. With the continuing influx of ICSID claims
against Argentina, the controversy created by Phillip Morris and countries like
Australia removing ISDS clauses in all future BITs, it is an interesting and dynamic
time in investor-State arbitration. Perhaps these events will inspire governments
and investors alike around the world to examine their own investment policies
more critically, especially in the context of social and economic crisis. As the
world is faced with new environmental, political and economic challenges, reform
to this area would allow the investor-State arbitration process to become more
sustainable, further in step with global discourse and better equipped to deal with
future challenges.

